Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause? by Esbeck, Carl H.
Kentucky Law Journal 
Volume 106 Issue 4 Article 3 
2018 
Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate the Establishment 
Clause? 
Carl H. Esbeck 
University of Missouri 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Esbeck, Carl H. (2018) "Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate the Establishment Clause?," 
Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 106 : Iss. 4 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol106/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact 
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions Violate
the Establishment Clause?
Carl H. Esbeck'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................. 603
INTRODUCTION ................................................ ......... 604
1. FOR GOVERNMENT TO LEAVE RELIGION ALONE DOES NOT ESTABLISH
RELIGION .......................................................... 6o8
A. A Tale of Two Cases: Amos and Caldor ..................... 6o8
B. Caldor Overturned a Religious Preference, not an Exemption............... 613
C Walz, Cutter, andO Centro all Uphold
Statutoy Re2gious Exemptions .................. .......... 618
D. Finding Something, Where There is Little to Nothing . .......... 621
E. OfBaselines and Fundamental Values................................................ 623
II. THE CONCEPT OF "THIRD-PARTY HARM" IS UNDEFINED AND
IMPOSSIBLY EXPANSIVE .................................................. 626
III. PLAIN LANGUAGE, COMMON SENSE, AND ORIGINAL MEANING............ 630
CONCLUSION ........................................................ 633
603
R. B. Price Professor Emeritus and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law Emeritus,
University of Missouri.
KENTUCKY LAWJOURNAL
INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause is not violated when government enacts regulatory or
tax legislation but provides, concerning these burdens, an exemption for those
holding conflicting religious beliefs and practices. Such accommodations are at the
discretion of a legislature and have as their purpose to ameliorate hardships borne by
religious minorities and other dissenters who find themselves out of step with the
prevailing social or legal culture. Statutory religious exemptions are commonplace in
this nation where there is a long and venerable tradition of religious tolerance toward
our neighbors, as well as those who have made their way to America to escape
persecution.
The presence of third parties who complain of incidental harm said to be the
result of these discretionary religious exemptions does not alter their
constitutionality. In an unbroken line of cases now spanning a century, the Supreme
Court of the United States has ten times rejected the argument that a religious
exemption in a larger regulatory or tax framework is an advancement of religion in
contravention of the Establishment Clause. There are no cases to the contrary that
have ever commanded a majority of the Supreme Court.
A categorical mistake has emerged in the secondary literature (but not the case
law) where statutory religious exemptions are being conflated with what are really
religious preferences. The two are quite different. As to preferences, it is entirely
proper to be concerned when a government intentionally favors religion over the
secular. Indeed, a few such statutory preferences have rightly been struck down as
unconstitutional when the preference in question was absolute in that it failed to take
into account consequential injury to third parties. Being able to distinguish those
cases upholding religious exemptions from cases that involve a religious preference is
paramount so as to not confuse these distinct lines of precedent.
Unlike preferences, a true exemption occurs when a dissenter's religious
observance is not swept into the scope of regulation even as others similarly situated
are made to labor under some new duty of the legislature's creation. Concerning an
exemption's constitutionality: simply put, government does not establish religion by
choosing to leave it alone. A true exemption, then, ensures that a regulatory or tax
burden imposed on others is not also thrust in the path of the religiously devout who
are predisposed to conform to their faith. Because their religious devotion, and not
the government's decision to withhold regulation, is the driving force behind the
religious observance complained of, any harm that befalls a third party is the result
ofwholly private conduct. And, of course, harm redressable under the Establishment
Clause (indeed, any provision of the Bill of Rights) must be injury caused by a "state
actor," not the work of a private actor. This is not to deny that third parties
sometimes incur harm, only a denial that the source behind any such harm is the
government.
This understanding of religious exemptions is nicely illustrated by the leading
case of Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
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Saints v. Amos.2 In Amos, a janitor who was dismissed from employment by
his
church-affiliated employer for failing to tithe to the church filed a claim for religious
discrimination.3 The janitor was acknowledged by the Supreme Court to have his
religious liberty constrained.4 The loss of liberty was at the hands of his own church,
however, and not as a consequence of a religious exemption provided by Congress
in the employment non-discrimination act.5 Justice White for the Court
wrote: "Undoubtedly, [the janitor's] freedom of choice in religious matters was
impinged upon, but it was the Church . .. and not the Government, who put him
to the choice of changing his religious practices or losing his job."6 The Act's
exemption is such that the church's religious discrimination was never, in the first
instance, within the regulatory scope of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7
So the church's private act of religious discrimination was not covered by the civil
rights law. The Establishment Clause, of course, restrains "state actors," not the
private actions of the church.
A religious preference, on the other hand, first arises when government takes
note of a dispute that involves religion and proceeds to try and resolve the conflict.
These disputes often emerge in a situation not of the state's creation, usually from
private social or market forces. When the legislature's intervening law takes the side
of the religious disputant, the government is intentionally preferring religion over
the secular. If the form of the government's resolution of the dispute goes on to
2 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
3 d. at 330.
4Id. at 337 n.15.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2012). In Title VII, Congress did not cover acts of religious
discrimination by religious employers. Ic. § 2000e-1(a). The nature of the religious employer exemption
in Title VII is sometimes misunderstood. The exemption reflects a determination by Congress that
religious employers should not be subjected to claims of religious discrimination. The exemption begins
with language that places this type of claim outside the scope of all Title VII ("This subchapter shall not
apply to . . . ."). Id. Nevertheless, courts till face misguided claims for religious discrimination brought
against a religious employer. The employee's argument is that the employer had a Title VII exemption,
but it behaved in such a way as to waive or forfeit the exemption. The courts, however, will not entertain
the question of waiver or forfeiture. This is proper because, given the employee's claim, the religious
employer was never within the scope of Title VII in the first instance. If not within the scope of Title VII,
then nothing the religious employer could have done or failed to do can expand upon Congress's decision
not to extend Title VII liability to religious employers acting out of their religion. See Hall v. Baptist
Mem'l Health Care Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that a religious employer who
received federal funding or held itself out as an equal opportunity employer did not and could not cause
waiver of Title VII exemption); Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a Catholic
K-12 school that knowingly hires a Lutheran teacher did not and could not result in a waiver of Title VII
exemption); Lown v. Salvation Army, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 223, 249-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding the
Protestant church's acceptance of a federal social-service grant did not cause forfeiture of Title VII
exemption); Siegel v. Truett-McConnell Coll., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (hiring
of Jewish faculty member by a Christian college did not and could not cause a waiver of Title VII
exemption); Ward v. Hengle, 706 N.E.2d 392, 395 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (holding entries by religious
employer in employee handbook concerning equal opportunity practices of employer did not and could
not cause waiver of Title VII exemption).
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unyieldingly side with religion such that any harm to third parties is not also weighed
in the balance, then the Supreme Court will strike down the preference. This is
entirely proper. The prototypical case is Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.' In
Caldor, a newly enacted Connecticut statute permitted employees who observe a
Sabbath to demand that their employer accommodate the employee's religious
practice.' In the case of such a preference-unlike an exemption-the government,
by empowering the religious claimant, is the causal agent or "state actor" behind any
harm to others. The Connecticut legislation failed to account for the scheduling
difficulties of the employer or the interests of fellow employees who also may want
their weekends free.'0 Ultimately what mattered, however, was not the pecuniary
injury to others, but the state's affirmative advancement of religion." The latter
injury is where the boundary between church and state was crossed. Caldor rightly
held that the Establishment Clause does not permit government to compel people
to have to readjust their lives in order that a fellow citizen can better practice his or
her religion.12
The blurring of the line between a true exemption and a true preference has
become a point of attack by a few academics who mount a constitutional objection
to the government carving-out religious exemptions.3 These scholars are particularly
distressed by the decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,14 with its broad
application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA")" that brought relief
to a closely held for-profit corporation.'6 More deeply, however, underlying the
472 U.S. 703 (1985).
Id. at 705-06.
10 I at 708-09.
"Id. at 710-11.
12 Id. at 708-11
13 See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for
Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAN. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 54-55, 61-62
(2014), https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2014/03/Gedicks-and-
KoppelmanInvisible-Women.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9JH-UKF6] (conflating the exemption in Amos
with the preference in Caldor); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions
from the Contraception Mandate:An UnconstitutionalAccommodation ofReligion, 49 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 343, 357-71 (2014) (conflating exemption cases like Amos with preference cases like
Caldor); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, & Nelson Tebbe, The Establishment Clause and the
Contraception Mandate, BLOGGER: BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013, 2:05 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html [https://perma.cc/6DU8-
QXAT] (characterizing Caldor as an exemption case rather than as a preference). For helpful
contrary views, see Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional
Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners at 15-17, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418,
14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 183794 at *15-17; Marc DeGirolami, On the
Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause, LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS
NETWORK: MIRROR OF JUSTICE, (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/12/exemptions-from-the-mandate-do-not-violate-the-
establishment-clause.html# [http://perma.cc/8GBW-T57U].
14 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
15 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012).
16 Even before the Supreme Court heard argument in Hobby Lobby, a few academics were urging
the Court to hold that the Establishment Clause prohibited a victory for Hobby Lobby Stores because of
incidental harm to third-party employees in terms of lost healthcare benefits. They were, of course,
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academics' view is that the Establishment Clause requires that the law be
religion-blind.7 That is, the text or face of legislation should not single out religion
for special benefits or special burdens.'" This "formal neutrality" means that
lawmakers would have to shut their eyes to the fact of America's religious pluralism,
namely that many of their constituents and fellow citizens are religious, and indeed
Americans practice many different religions. In Hobby Lobby; the operation of RFRA
is the opposite of formal neutrality. It is a religious exemption writ large, one that is
particularly powerful in getting the federal government to pay attention when it
promulgates laws that are formally neutral as to religion. RFRA requires federal
lawmakers to accommodate religious claimants case-by-case or show a compelling reason
not to.'9 In the context of Hobby Lobby where as suggested by the theory of formal
neutrality elected lawmakers must feign ignorance of America's religious diversity, that
would mean modern regulatory and entitlement laws will end up brushing aside the
special needs of religious minorities. This is not who we are as Americans.
In some instances, no doubt, elected lawmakers hould exercise their discretion and
narrow or deny a class of religiously faithful people their sought-after exemption. In
lawmaking, it is entirely proper that any palpable harm to third parties is part of the
overall political calculus. This is the familiar balancing for the common good by the two
political branches, legislative and executive. However, the focus of this article is on
whether elected lawmakers are constitutionally prohibited from enacting religious
exemptions. They are not. And once the political branches have struck their balance and
enacted a law, the judicial branch should not interject itself into the matter and rebalance
the equities under the guise of discovering a constitutional violation. There is no rule,
longstanding or recent, that statutory religious exemptions violate the Establishment
Clause when there is incidental harm to third parties.
unsuccessfil in that effort. See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 13 at 54-57; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra
note 13 at 357-62; Schwartzman, Schrager & Tebbe, supra note 13; Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger, &
Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part f: What Counts as a Burden on
Employees?, BLOGGER: BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013, 6:04 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html [https://perma.cc/MC24-
D8L9] [hereinafter Tebbe, Establishment Clause PartI]; Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, &Nelson
Tebbe, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part Iff. Reconciblng Amos and Cutter, BLOGGER:
BALKINIZATION (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:15 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-1obby-and-
establishment-clause_9.html [https://perma.cc/54GH-6PNC] [hereinafter Schwartzman, Establishment
Clause Part lT].
" See BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 100-01, 130-33 (2013); Micah Schwartzman,
WthatlfReligion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 1351 (2012).
s Formal neutrality is not a new idea. Fifty-seven years ago, Professor Philip Kurland proposed a
"neutral principle" where the text of a law must not acknowledge religion, whether it be to help or hinder
it. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 2 (1961).
Kurland's abstraction initially drew widespread interest, in part because of its simplicity in application.
Indeed, the article was soon republished as a small monograph. See PHILIP B. KURLAND, RELIGION
AND THE LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1st ed. 1962). Interest just as
quickly faded when the "neutral principle" was discredited by a scholar who had actual experience with
church-state law and was familiar with the long American story of welcoming religious minorities. See
Leo Pfeffer,
Religion-Blind Government, 15 STAN. L. REV. 389 (1963) (book review).
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
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Part I of this article compares the leading cases of Amos and Walz v. Tax
Commission of City of New York,20 on the one hand, with Caldor, on the other,
clarifying the distinction between a religious exemption and a religious preference. The
article will show that discretionary exemptions leave private religious observance outside
the scope of intended regulation. Should that observance cause harm to others, the harm
is that of a private actor-not "state action"-and thus the Establishment Clause cannot
possibly be triggered. Also surveyed are eight additional Supreme Court exemption cases,
which are distinguished from preference cases like Caldor, Board ofEducation ofKTas
Joel Village School District v. Gmmet,21 Lakin v. Grendels Den, Inc.,22 and Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison.23 Part II notes that a few scholars assume-
mistakenly-that private conduct within the scope of a religious exemption is "state
action," and they seek to balance that exemption against incidental harms that sometimes
befall third parties. They insist on this balancing, not as a matter of legislative discretion,
but as a constitutional imperative derived from the Establishment Clause. The claim
firther assumes that "third-party harm" is a juridical category that can be both defined
and bounded. It cannot. Thus, the logic behind the category risks expanding and
overwhelming every religious exemption. Finally, Part III demonstrates that the plain
text of the Religion Clauses does not categorically require religion-blind government or
formal neutrality. Rather, the matter of exemptions is discretionary with the two political
branches. Thus, the First Amendment allows and sometimes requires accommodating
our fellow citizens who are religious. The article goes on to draw upon surveys showing
that the nation's founding generation did not regard a religious exemption as an
establishment. Indeed, at present there are thousands of religious exemptions in local,
state, and federal law. To abolish them all would work primarily to the injury of religious
minorities, which would bring about a sea of change in the venerable American practice
of extending a welcoming hand to peoples of diverse faiths.
I. FOR GOVERNMENT TO LEAVE RELIGION ALONE DOES NOT ESTABLISH
RELIGION
A. A Tale of Two Cases: Amos and Caldor
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently held that when
generally applicable regulatory or tax legislation imposes a burden on religious belief
or practice, a legislative body is free to forestall the burden by providing an
accommodation. For the lawmaker to refrain from imposing such a burden is what
is termed a discretionary religious exemption.24 To exempt religious observance from
20 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
21 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
22 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
23 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
24 Religious exemptions required by the Free Exercise Clause, or what might be termed a "mandated
religious exemption," also do not to run afoul of the Establishment Clause. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 234 n.22 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963). This is only logical, for
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general regulatory or tax legislation has the net effect of leaving religion alone. And
government does not establish religion by leaving it alone.
In an unbroken line of seven cases, the Supreme Court has rejected the argument
that a religious exemption in a larger regulatory or tax framework is an active
involvement with religion that violates the Establishment Clause. The leading case
is Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-day Saints
v. Amos,25 in which the Court upheld a statutory exemption in Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.26 Title VII refrains from regulating religious employers when it
comes to an adverse employment decision based on the employer's religion. Mayson,
a janitor employed at a gymnasium operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, was discharged because he ceased to be a church member in good
standing.27 The Court began by reaffirming that the Establishment Clause does not
mean that government must be indifferent to religion, but aims at government not
"acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters."28
The Title VII exemption, however, was not an instance of government "abandoning
neutrality," for "it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate" a regulatory law
when it burdens religion, thereby continuing to leave religious organizations free "to
define and carry out their religious missions" as they see fit.29
In addition to Amos, the Court has on six other plenary reviews turned back an
Establishment Clause challenge to a discretionary religious exemption. In Cutter v.
Wilkinson, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
("RLUIPA"), 30 which accommodates religious observance by prison inmates
otherwise subject to correctional policies, was found not to violate the Establishment
otherwise we would have the nonsensical situation in which the Free Exercise Clause violates the
Establishment Clause.
25 483 U.S. 327 (1987). Progressives realize that Amos, more than any other case, stands athwart their
agenda. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13 at 368-70; Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Part
III, supra note 16. One of their attempts to narrow Amos is to cite arguments by Justices Brennan and
O'Connor who authored separate opinions concurring in the judgment. See, e.g., Schwartzman,
Establishment Clause Part I, supra note 16. But Justice White, writing for the Amos Court, did not
need the vote of either justice to command a majority and, obviously, was not persuaded by their views.
So Amos is not only not narrowed by either concurrence, but it is fair to infer that the Court majority
considered their arguments for narrowing Amos and rejected them. Justices Brennan and O'Connor
would have limited the holding to nonprofit employers. But any such distinction between for-profit and
nonprofit corporations was rejected in Hobby Lobby 134 S. Ct. at 2769-72. A second means by which
progressives seek to push aside Amos is to recast it in terms of church autonomy. See Gedicks & Van
Tassell, supra note 13 at 369-71; Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Part III, supra note 16. But the
Supreme Court has never "explained" Amos in that fashion. Indeed, in the leading church-autonomy case
a unanimous Supreme Court failed to even mention Amos. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). The Court's past church-autonomy cases were
catalogued in Hosanna-Tabor, and Amos was not among them. Id. at 185-87.
26 The religious employer exemption at issue in Amos is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a). There is a second
religious employer exemption in the 1964 Civil Rights Act for educational institutions only. See id. §
2000e-2(e)(2).
27 Amos, 483 U.S. at 330.
21 Idat 335.
29 Id. Arnos is further discussed supra notes 2-6 and infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2012).
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Clause.3' In Gillette v. United States, a religious exemption from the military draft
for those opposed to all wars was found not to violate the Establishment Clause.32 In
Walz v. Tax Commission of New York, a municipal property tax ordinance that
exempted religious nonprofit organizations was held not to violate the Establishment
Clause.33 The Court in Zorach v. Clauson found that a public-school policy of release
from the state compulsory education law to allow pupils who desired to attend, with
parental permission, private religion classes away from the school grounds did not
violate the Establishment Clause.34 In Arver v. United States, the draft exemptions
during World War I pertaining to clergy, seminarians, and pacifists were found not
to violate the Establishment Clause.35 Finally, in Goldman v. United States, the
Court summarily rejected constitutional claims to the same military draft
exemptions, relying on the newly decided Arver.36
A case similar to Amos previously had reached the Supreme Court through
mandatory appellate review and was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question.37 Additionally, two cases similar to Walz previously had reached the
Supreme Court through mandatory appellate review and were also summarily
dismissed.38 So the results in Amos and Walz were presaged by these summary
dismissals. All three cases are binding precedent.39
In addition to the seven plenary opinions of the Supreme Court and the three
summary dismissals, there were cases in the High Court in which a religious
exemption was prominent but neither party bothered to argue that the exemption
violated the Establishment Clause. These cases can be viewed as giving tacit
31 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005); see also inkTa notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
32 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-60 (1971).
33 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
34 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308-15 (1952).
35 Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 376, 389 (1918).
36 Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474, 476 (1918). Arver and Goldman also illustrate that a
religious exemption can be granted by a legislature even in the absence of coercion of religiously informed
conscience. The World War I exemption to the draft embraced not only religious pacifists, but also clergy
and seminarians without regard to the latter two showing they would suffer a religious burden if drafted.
See id; Arver, 245 U.S. at 367.
37 See Arlan's Dep't Store of Louisville, Inc. v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962), dismissing appealfor
want of a substantial federal question from 357 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Ky. 1962) (holding that state law
requiring retail businesses to close on Sunday, with an exception for those businesses owned by persons
who observed Saturday as their Sabbath, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
31 See Gen. Fin. Corp. v. Archetto, 369 U.S. 423 (1962), dismissing appeal for want ofa substantial
federal question from 176 A.2d 73, 76-78 (R.I. 1961) (holding that property tax exemption available to
religious organizations did not violate Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, nor did the exemption
violate equal protection or due process); Heisey v. City of Alameda, 352 U.S. 921 (1956), dismissing
appeal for want ofa substantialfederal question from Lundberg v. City of Alameda, 298 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal.
1956) (holding that property tax exemption available to a religious school did not violate Establishment
Clause).
39 A summary dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question by the Supreme Court is a decision
on the merits and thus binding precedent on all lower courts. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176
(1977).
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acceptance to the lawfulness of the religious exemption featured in each case.40 But
that is not all: occasionally the Supreme Court itself fashions a religious exception to
generally applicable legislation.4' The Court would not have created a judge-made
religious exemption to avoid governmental oversight of religion if it violated the
Establishment Clause. Finally, numerous individual justices have stated that they do
not think that discretionary religious exemptions from general regulatory legislation
are a violation of the Establishment Clause.42
One would think this array of binding precedent and a century of case-law fidelity
is bulletproof. Nevertheless, a handful of progressives seek to break with this
formidable wall of precedent when there is incidental harm to third parties. Early on
they relied on Caldor,44 then on two plurality opinions that involve religious
4 See, e.g., Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1663 (2017) (applying
"church plan" exception to employee benefit package formed by religious health care organizations that
would otherwise be subject to ERISA); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015) (applying RLUIPA
to provide accommodation for prison inmate); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751,
2759 (2014) (applying RFRA to exempt for-profit closely held employer from employee health insurance
mandate promulgated under Affordable Care Act involving coverage for abortifacients); Davis v. United
States, 495 U.S. 472, 488-89 (1990) (concerning federal income tax deductibility of contributions to
religious charities); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 688 (1989) (concerning federal income tax
deductibility of contributions to religious charities); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-60 (1982)
(concerning exemption from federal Social Security contributions by Amish who have long history of
taking care of their aged members as a religious obligation); St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 776-77 (1981) (holding that the Federal Unemployment Tax Act exempted
churches and church-related schools).
41 See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (recognizing federal common-law
clergy testimonial privilege); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979) (holding
that K-12 religious schools are not subject to National Labor Relations Act and collective bargaining);
Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458, 463 (1892) (holding that federal legislation
prohibiting employment of aliens to work in the U.S. not applicable to clergy being recruited by U.S.
church).
42 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2031-32 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (approving of the religious exemptions in Walz and Amos); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 371-72 (1970) (White, J., dissenting); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422-23
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 511 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
separate opinion).
43 With respect to some of the Supreme Court's religious exemption cases there is no measurable
harm incurred by identifiable third parties. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 667,
675-76 (holding that less property tax revenue received by the city causes no measurable harm to
identifiable third parties). With respect to other religious exemption cases there is measurable incidental
harm to identifiable third parties. See, e.g., Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 330, 339-40 (1987) (holding that a Mormon Church
employee's dismissal for failing to maintain membership in the church did not violate the Establishment
Clause). However, this is not a distinction made by the Supreme Court when applying the Establishment
Clause. A few academics, objecting to discretionary religious exemptions, insist on the distinction to
salvage their theses. See infra notes 162-168 and accompanying text (criticizing the distinction).
4 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). For progressive reliance on Caldor, see
Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 13, at 54, 61-62; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 357-58,
363-67; Schwartzman, Schragger &Tebbe, supra note 13; Schwartzman, Establishment Clause PartIlj
supra note 16.
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accommodations: Grumet5 and Texas Monthy, Inc. v. Bullock.46 However, both
Grumet and Texas Monthlywere decided on grounds other than the progressive's
argument that the Establishment Clause is violated when there is harm to third
parties. In Grumet, the New York legislature had responded to complaints from
parents by creating a new public school district coterminous with the boundaries of
a village enclave housing an Orthodox Jewish community.47 The purpose was to
better serve the special education needs of an unusually high numbered of disabled
children born to this insular Jewish sect.48 However, the legislation violated a
longstanding rule that government may not utilize a classification, one based on
denominational or sectarian affiliation, to extend benefits or impose burdens, no
matter how meritorious the cause.49 Furthermore, like Caldor, the statute in Grumet
was a preference and not an exemption. Perhaps most important for present
purposes, all nine Justices in Grumet took care to say that discretionary religious
exemptions are constitutional.50
In Texas Monthly a case that struck down a religious exemption, the three-
justice plurality did not follow the rule that progressives urge here.
5 ' The case
4 Bd. of Educ. of KiryasJoel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (plurality opinion in
part).
46 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (plurality opinion). For progressive reliance on Grumetand Texas Monthly, see
Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 357-58 & n.54.
47 Grumet, 512 U.S. at 690.
4
1 Id. at 693.
49 Id. at 702-08; see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450-51, 454 (1971) (upholding
military draft exemption for those that oppose all war but not those who only oppose wars believed unjust);
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-48, 246 n.23, 253 (1982) (striking down state charitable solicitation
law because it intentionally discriminated against new or emerging religious movements and explaining
Gillette). The rationale for the rule is that the Supreme Court wants to avoid making membership in a
religious denomination more or less attractive. If this were not the rule of law, then merely holding
religious membership in a particular religious denomination would result in the availability of a desirable
civil advantage. For example, it would violate the rule if Congress were to confer conscientious objector
draft status on all Quakers, for that may induce conversions (real or pseudo) to Quakerism. Although
unintended, that would have establishment implications.
o Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705 ("[T]he Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by
alleviating special burdens."); id. at 711-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (distinguishing the facts of Grumet
from "a decision to grant an exemption from a burdensome general rule"); id. at 716 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The Constitution permits 'nondiscrimhinatory religious-practice exemption[s] . . . .')
(emphasis added by Justice O'Connor) (quoting Emp. Division, Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990)); id. at 723-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (approving Amos and similar cases);
id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has also long acknowledged the permissibility of legislative
accommodation."). Further, all the justices in Emp. Diision v. Smith, went out of their way to affirm
that religious exemptions were constitutional. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890 (1990) ("[A] nondiscriminatory
religious-practice exemption is permitted . . . ."); see also id at 893-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (explaining that regulatory exemptions are not only permitted but sometimes constitutionally
required).
" If the plurality's rule in Texas Monthly is that marked by "we hold," then the relevant words
are: 'We hold that, when confined exclusively to publications advancing the tenets of a religious faith, the
exemption runs afoul of the Establishment Clause." Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5 (three justice plurality).
Given that the tax exemption in question was limited to publications by a religion of "books that consist
wholly of writings sacred" and "consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith," that
narrow class carved from a larger class consisting of all religions publications is going to prefer some
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involved a sales tax exclusion on purchases of sacred books and other literature that
promote a particular religious faith.52 No opinion in Texas Monthlycommanded the
vote of more than three justices, so the result is unsuitable as precedent for much of
any principle of law.53 In a footnote, Justice Brennan, writing for himself and two
other justices, advanced the idea that third-party harm rose to a violation of the
Establishment Clause.54 However, three votes out of nine demonstrates that the
third-party harm suggestion is not the Court's rule and never has been. What cannot
be dismissed in Texas Monthlyis that eight justices explicitly reaffirmed the rule in
Amos upholding discretionary religious exemptions, and the ninth (Justice White)
wrote the opinion in Amos.5 5 In sum, statutory religious exemptions have been
broadly and unwaveringly supported by the United States Supreme Court for the
past one hundred years. Not one case to the contrary has ever commanded the
support of a majority of the Court.
B. Caldor Overturned aReligious Preference, not an Exemption
The important case of Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. did indeed strike down
a Connecticut statute because it was in violation of the Establishment Clause.6 The
statute, however, was not a religious exemption from a regulatory or tax burden but
was a religious preference.5 7 Additionally, the statute in Caldorwas "unyielding" in
that it disregarded the competing interests of the religious claimant's employer and
his fellow workers.58 It was the combination of these two features that was fatal to
the state statute.
The Connecticut legislature was making retailing on Sunday lawful.59
Anticipating that the repeal of the Sunday-closing law would soon lead to scheduling
conflicts between employers and employees, the state legislature took sides,
denominations while excluding others. Id. As such, the classification advances some religious groups but
leaves others behind. That violates the same rule applied in Grumet See supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
52 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 5.
53 That sales tax statute exempted only publications by religious organizations, not religious
publications generally. Id. Further, the law exempted only "writings promulgating the faith," not those
more generally about the religion but not promoting it, and certainly not writings critical of the faith. Id
These are content-based and viewpoint discriminations that are normally fatal under free speech and free
press precedent. Thus, there were multiple ways of finding the tax exemption in Texas Monthly
unconstitutional without implicating the rule at issue here.
54 See 489 U.S. at 18 n.8.
See id (approving Amos); id at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (approving Amos); id at 38-40
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that regulatory and tax exemptions are generally permitted and sometimes
required). Justice White said nothing about the exemption and third parties, but would have struck down
the tax exemption as a discriminatory speech regulation in violation of the Free Press Clause. Id at 25-26
(White, J., concurring).
56 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710-11 (1985).
* See id. at 709-10.
s See id.
5 See id. at 705 n.2.
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specifically the side of the religious employee over the retail employer.60 The new
statute read in part: "No person who states that a particular day of the week is
observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day."'
Donald Thornton was an employee of Caldor, Inc., a retail department store.62 He
was a Presbyterian and observed Sunday as his Sabbath.63 When the department
store began opening on Sundays, Thornton worked Sundays once or twice a month.6 4
Unhappy with this arrangement, he invoked the statute demanding his Sundays off.65
The store resisted and in time a lawsuit was filed on Thornton's behalf by the State
Board of Mediation.66 The store's defense was that the Connecticut statute violated
the Establishment Clause, and the Supreme Court agreed.7
The Supreme Court found that the Connecticut law was forcing some in the
private sector to assist in the religious observance of a fellow citizens." That is what
a preference often does: the government compels one private citizen to help another
private citizen better conform to his or her religion.9 An exemption does not do that;
in Amos, for example, the janitor lost his job as a result of the private action of his
church not the government.70 The religious preference in Caldor was doubly
offensive, for the statutory right was "unyielding."" That is, the statute took no notice
of the commercial burden imposed on the employer or of the inconvenience to
co-workers who would have to fill in for Thornton during his absence on Sundays.7 2
The commercial burden on Caldor Stores gave it standing to raise the Establishment
Clause defense. But it was the statute compelling private parties to assist Thornton
in his religious duties that crossed the boundary between church and state, thus
violating the Establishment Clause.73
6o See id. at 706 n.3.
61 Id. at 706.
62 Id. at 705.
63 Id. at 705-06.
64 See id at 705.
65 Id. at 706.
66 Id. at 706-07.
67 Id. at 707, 710-11.
6s See id at 710.
69 See id at 708 ("[G]overnment ... must take pains not to compel people to act in the name of any
religion.").
70 See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, at 337 n.15 (1987) ("Undoubtedly, Mayson's freedom of choice in religious matters was
impinged upon, but it was the Church . . . and not the Government, who put him to the choice of
changing his religious practices or losing his job.").
"' See Caldor, 472 U.S. at 709-10.
72 Id. at 708-09.
73 The Court in Caldor quoted with approval a line from an opinion by Judge Learned Hand: "The
First Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their own interests, others must
conform their conduct to his own religious necessities." Id. at 710 (omission in the original) (citation
omitted). Progressives latched onto the quote to buttress their claim that exemptions are unconstitutional.
See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 357-58; Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare
and Religion and Arguing off the Wall, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:32 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/obamacare-birth-control-man
datelawsuithow_a_radicalargumentwentmainstream.html [https://perma.cc/RHC9-44JY]. But
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Thornton's religious burden, lifted by the state law, was not the result of a
regulatory duty of the government's own making but the result of the private
demands of the store's retailing. In response, the Connecticut law actively
empowered people like Thornton to demand the assistance of private parties to
secure the observance of his Sabbath. That is "state action." Caldor is thus unlike
Amos, the latter involving an exemption reflecting a government that is passive.
Passivity is not "state action."
Several months later, the Supreme Court was called on to distinguish the
exemption in Amos from the preference in Caldor. In Amos, a religious exemption
in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act meant that religious employers were not
subject to the general prohibition on employment discrimination when motivated by
their religion.74 Mayson, a janitor, claimed that the statutory exemption shifted a
burden to him resulting in the loss of his job.75 He argued that the exemption
pressured him to conform his conduct to the religious rules of his church.7' This
taking sides in favor of religion was, claimed Mayson, a violation of the
Establishment Clause.7 7 The High Court disagreed:
Undoubtedly, Mayson's freedom of choice in religious matters was
impinged upon, but it was the Church . . . and not the Government, who
put him to the choice of changing his religious practices or losing his job.
This is a very different case than Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc ....
In Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting an
employer from requiring an employee to work on a day designated by the
employee as his Sabbath. In effect, Connecticut had given the force of law
to the employee's designation of a Sabbath day and required
accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden which that
constituted for the employer or other employees. See Hobbie... 480 U.S.
[at] 145 n.11 (1987). In the present cases, appellee Mayson was not legally
obligated to take the steps necessary to qualify for a temple recommend,
and his discharge was not required by statute.7 '
they have taken Judge Hand's quotation out of context. See Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and
Complicity Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby's Wake, 82 U. OF CHI. L. REV.
1897, 1968 n.259 (2015). On more careful examination, the Hand quotation "contemplates not cases in
which someone seeks a religious accommodation and third parties are affected incidentally, instead, it
applies to cases in which controlling third parties' conduct is the precise and onlypurpose of the sought-
after accommodation." Id. (emphasis in original). This fuller reading "underscores that what mattered to
the Court in Thornton was government supportforrelgion and not government accommodations that
shift burdens to third parties." Id. (emphasis in original). In short, the Hand quotation applies to
preferences, not exemptions.
74 Amos, 483 U.S. at 329. See supra note 7.
7 See id. at 337 n.15.
76 See id at 330-31.
7 Id at 331.
7s Id. at 337 n.15. Cited in the quotation in the text is Hobbic v. Unemp'tAppeals Commn ofFla.,
480 U.S. 136, 145 n.11 (1987). Hobbic was a successful claim under the Free Exercise Clause, and thus
involved not a discretionary religious exemption but one that was mandated. See supra note 24.
Nevertheless, as the quotation in the text indicates, footnote 11 in Hobbic identifies the same two factors
for why the preference in Caldorwas unconstitutional. Hobbic, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11.
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As is now plain, important to understanding Amos is that the Court did not deny
that Mayson suffered a harm. Rather, the Court saw that the source of Mayson's
harm was not the government and thus there was no "state action" capable of
triggering the Establishment Clause."
The Court distinguished Cddor from Amos by two features. First, the
Connecticut statute was not a passive shield from a larger regulatory burden imposed
by the state, but a sword wielded by the state forcing others in the private sector to
facilitate the religious practices of Thornton and others like him." Unlike Cddor's
preference in which the government intervened in a private-sector dispute by siding
with religion, in Amos Congress left religious employers with the same powers as
they had before the passage of Title VIl. Accordingly, it was the actions of Mayson's
church and not the exemption provided by Congress that was the cause of Mayson
losing his job. The Establishment Clause restrains the government, not the church.
The church is not a "state actor." This rule is not unique to the Establishment Clause.
It is a longstanding "state action" doctrine;"' the government's passivity concerning
the conduct of a private party, and that party in turn electing to take some action to
the harm of a third party, has never been considered "state action." Second, the
statute in Caldorfavored the religious claimant absolutely, thus wholly disregarding
the interests of others in the private sector. This second feature pushed the preference
over the line separating church and state, making it unconstitutional.82
It is possible to have a religious preference and still pass constitutional challenge.
In TWA v. Hardison the statutory provision in question was a religious preference.83
The provision appears in section 2000e(j) of the U.S.C. codification of the 1972
amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and requires employers to
adjust to the needs of their religious employees.8 4 However, the employer's duty of
79 SeeAmos, 483 U.S. at 337.
s See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709-11 (1985).
s' See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 54 (1999) ("As we have said before, our
cases will not tolerate the imposition of Fourteenth Amendment restraints on private action by the simple
device of characterizing the State's inaction as authorization or encouragement.") (citation and quotation
marks omitted); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-64 (1978) (holding that acknowledgement
in UCC of landlord's right of self-help in evicting tenant is not "state action" and thus the Due Process
Clause is not implicated). For a similar "state action" analysis to explain why religious exemptions have
government merely leaving religion alone and thus cannot violate the Establishment Clause, see Josh
Blackman, Hobby Lobby, RFRA, anda 'Pivate" Establishment Clause, JOSH BLACKMAN'S BLOG (Jan. 21,
2014), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2014/01/21/hobby-lobby-rfra-and-a-private-establishment-clause/.
32 Progressives attempt to discredit how Amos distinguished Caldor by calling it "incoherent" and
"mistaken," and then engage in a little chest thumping over how "[their] account is superior" to the Amos
Court's reconciliation of Caldor to Amos. Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Part III, supra note 16.
The essence of their bravado, however, is that they disagree with the Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause-an original meaning shared by the nation's founding generation-that religious
exemptions are not an establishment of religion. See infra notes 145, 187, 190 and accompanying text.
13 TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). Care should be exercised to not confuse Title VII's preference favoring
religious employees in section 2000e(j), a duty imposed on employers, with Title VII's exemptions for
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religious accommodation is not "unyielding," for the duty dissolves in the face of the
employer meeting the burden of showing "undue hardship."" The Supreme Court
did not reach the claim that section 2000e(j) violated the Establishment Clause,"
albeit the prospect of such a ruling likely influenced the Court's interpretation of the
statute so that little is required to show "undue hardship."7 The Court held:
To require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
[the employee-claimant] Saturdays off is an undue hardship. Like
abandonment of the seniority system, to require TWA to bear additional
costs when no such costs are incurred to give other employees the days off
that they want would involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis
of their religion."
The Court sought to avoid a preference favoring the religion of the
employee-claimant over his or her fellow employees who might want the day off for
nonreligious reasons, for such favoritism had the appearance of a religious
establishment.
The preference at issue in TWA was unlike the religious exemption in Amos. In
TWA, there was no regulatory scheme generally binding on employees from which
a religious claimant was being relieved by the government. Rather, Congress enacted
section 2000e(j) to address a religious conflict created by private market forces. To
that conflict, the government stepped in and took the side of the religious claimant
over that of the commercial employer. In that sense, section 2000e(j) is like Caldor,
a religious preference, and one for which the Court harbored Establishment Clause
concerns. However, unlike in Caldor, the section 2000e(j) preference is not
absolute: employers need not comply if they can show that the requested
accommodation would create an "undue hardship."" The TWA Court avoided
reaching the Establishment Clause question by interpreting the preference as
relieving the employer from the duty to accommodate an employee when the burden
was more than de minimis." So long as the statutory preference costs the employer
nothing or next to nothing, then the employee preference is harmless to the
employer. No harm, no foul.
In addition to Caldor and TWA, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,` is a helpful
example of a religious preference. Larkin struck down a veto right vested in churches
by a municipal ordinance concerning issuance of liquor licenses within a 500-foot
religious employers found in sections 2000e-1(a) and 2000e-2(e)(2). TWA involved the former and Amos
the latter.
s See TWA, 432 U.S. at 84-85.
s6 See id. at 69 n.4.
See id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court's interpretation of the statute, by effectively
nullifying it, has the singular advantage of making consideration of [TWA's] constitutional challenge
unnecessary.").
Id. at 84 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
8942 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012).
9 See TWA, 432 U.S. at 84.
91 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
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radius of any church.92 Religion was preferred by the city over private retailing
interests, and the preference was unyielding. The Court hastened to point out that
it was not uncommon for a city to consider, along with other factors, the desire of
churches to be free from noisy and rowdy neighbors.93 That would have been
constitutional. But the zoning ordinance cannot go the next step and grant an
absolute veto in favor of religion over business interests.94
C. Walz, Cutter, and 0 Centro all Uphold Statutory Religious Exemptions
In Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York, the Supreme Court
considered whether a municipal property tax exemption for churches and other
houses ofworship advanced religion in violation of the Establishment Clause." By a
lopsided division of 8-to-1, the Court held that it did not. The Court in Walz
reached two conclusions of law. First, it held that the tax exemption for religious
organizations was not a subsidy, but the government electing not to impose a burden
on religion and thus leaving religion alone.6 In the Court's own words, the "grant of
a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its
revenue to churches but [it] simply abstains from demanding that the church support
the state."" The Court distinguished between an exemption and a subsidy saying
that it "cannot read New York's statute as attempting to establish religion; it is simply
sparing the exercise of religion from the burden of property taxation levied on
[others."" The proposition is simple: government does not establish religion by
leaving it alone. As to the virtue of "leaving churches alone" arising from the principle
of church-state separation, the Court observed: "The hazards of churches supporting
government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of government
supporting churches; each relationship carries some involvement rather than the
desired insulation and separation."" Unlike a religious preference, a tax exemption
for religious entities "tends to complement and reinforce the desired separation
[thereby] insulating each from the other."1 00
92 See id at 117.
9 See id. at 125.
9 Id. at 124 nn.7-8. Unlike the preference in cases like Caldor and Larkin, which involve attempts
by the legislature to intervene in a private-sector dispute on the side of religion, there are laws that might
be called a naked religious preference. These are uncommon today, but Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488
(1961), is illustrative. The case involved an oath declaring belief in God as a requirement for holding state
office. Id at 489-90. The Court had little trouble finding the preference for monotheism unconstitutional.
Id at 496. It is termed a "naked" preference because the law came about quite apart from any effort by the
state to resolve a private dispute between two of its citizens. The Religious Test Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 3, likewise prevents a naked religious preference with respect to the qualifications of federal
officeholders.
9 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 666-67 (1970).
96 See id at 675 (majority opinion).
97 
d.
9
'
3
Id. at673.
99 Id. at 675 (footnote omitted).
.oo Id. at 676.
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Second, as a justification for upholding the tax exemption, the Walz Court
rejected a quid pro quo argument: that the exemption compensates religious groups
for generating social capital through their provision of welfare services, education,
and health care.'0 ' Religious charities do just that,102 but viewing the tax exemption
as a reward for "good works" invites unconstitutional entanglement by way of
"governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth of particular social welfare
programs, thus producing a kind of continuing day-to-day relationship which the
policy of neutrality seeks to minimize."103 Moreover, a reward-for-works rationale
would risk violating the rule against authorities taking-up religious questions
concerning the validity, meaning, or importance of religious beliefs and practices.104
The rationale behind the no-religious-questions rule is that the government lacks
the jurisdiction to make judgments concerning the civic value of religious practices.
If the state had such power, soon there would be churches "approved" by the
government, and those not. To contemplate civil courts passing on such questions
implies an established church against which "unapproved" ministries and
"underperforming" churches are civilly tested and found wanting. The courts are not
theological umpires, scoring each church's performance on a Yelp-like five-star scale.
The Walz Court noted that religious organizations were not alone in their
tax-exempt status under the city ordinance, but were joined by art, educational, and
poverty-relief organizations.105 However, the Court never said that the inclusion of
secular organizations in the tax exemption was necessary to its holding. Indeed, in
cases like Amoso6 and Zorach v. Clauson, 107 the Court upheld exemptions that were
exclusive to religious organizations or religion.
The religious exemption at issue in Cutter v. Wilkinson was the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), a law accommodating religious
inmates in federal and state correctional facilities.' Justice Ginsburg, writing for a
101 Id. at 674.
102 The annual socioeconomic impact of religion in the United States is presently valued at nearly
$1.2 trillion, with social services and health care comprising $256 billion of that share. Brian J. Grim &
Melissa E. Grim, The Socio-economic Contribution of Religion to American Society: An Empirical
Analysis, 12 INTERDISCIPLINARYJ. OF RESEARCH ON RELIGION 2, 24-25 (2016).
103 Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. Justice Brennan's concurrence did rely on the reward-for-works
justification, but no other justice joined his opinion. See id. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
104 The rule denying civil authority to pass on religious questions arises frequently; it appears in cases
decided under the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Free Speech Clause. See, e.g.,
Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (Free Exercise Clause); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6, 271 n.9, 272 n.11 (1981) (Free Speech Clause); Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 181-90 (2012) (holding that
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses barred civil resolution of question whether minister's duties were
exclusively religious or a mix of religious and secular).
105 Wah, 397 U.S. at 666-67 &n.1, 673.
106 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 325, 338-39 (1987) (upholding religious employer exemption in employment nondiscrimination
laws).
107 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (upholding a local public school release-time policy that exempted
students from a state compulsory education attendance law to attend religion classes).
10s Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005).
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unanimous Court, said: given the provision in RLUIPA that required courts to "take
adequate account of the burdens [that] a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries," the act satisfied the strictures of the Establishment Clause.'
Because it was a facial challenge, Cutter was an easy case. The Court could either
uphold RLUIPA because the act was an exemption not a preference or because
RLUIPA by its terms was not "unyielding" to the interests of third parties. The
former path would have commanded a majority of the Court but-even better-the
latter course would yield a unanimous opinion."0 The Court took the path where all
nine justices could agree on a single rationale for upholding the act's constitutionality.
Unanimity in a First Amendment church-state case is both desirable and rare, made
possible in Cutterbecause the challenge was facial and thus the holding was narrow.
Being a facial challenge, however, Cutter did not do away with the first feature of
the distinguishing criteria: exemptions versus preferences.
Those relying on Cutter as rejecting Amos"' are vastly overreading the case.112
This can be seen in another RLUIPA case that came along ten years later, Holt v.
Hobbs.113 Like Cutter, the Court in Holtended up granting relief for a prison inmate
in a claim for religious accommodation."4 The State of Arkansas in Holt did not
even bother to raise the argument that to accommodate the religious needs of one or
a few inmates would inconvenience others at correctional facilities in violation of the
Establishment Clause."15
In Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, involving an
encounter with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), a small religious
sect successfully sought an exemption from the federal criminal law banning the
importation of a hallucinogenic drug."6 In the case, the federal government argued
that it had satisfied its burden under RFRA's compelling-interest test by claiming a
109 Id. at 720. The Court was referring to RLUIPA's compelling interest test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
1(a) (2012).
110 Id. at 720 (majority opinion) ("[RLUIPA] on its face does not founder on shoals our prior decisions
have identified: Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the burdens a requested
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries [.]" (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703 (1985)). It was also the easier path because a balancing of all competing interests, including those of
third parties, was facially required by the compelling-interest est built into RLUIPA. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-1(a).
... See, e.g., Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 13, at 61-62; Schwartzman, Schragger & Tebbe,
supra note 13; Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Part I, supra note 16.
112 The Cutter Court, without so much as a concurring or dissenting opinion, would not sweep aside
a long line of ten of its own cases, including such workhorses as Amos and Walz, without so much as a
word about breaking with precedents that go back a century to the World War I draft exemption upheld
in Arverand Goldman. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Cutter Court would
not, without so much as a concurring or dissenting opinion, brush aside the two-feature test for
distinguishing Caldorfrom Amos. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
113 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
114 Id. at 863-67. In accord with his Islamic faith, a penitentiary inmate sought o grow a half-inch
beard. Id. at 859. The case turned on correctional authorities being unable to show that their concern for
prison security was plausible, let alone compelling. Id. at 863-66. The Court was unanimous. Id. at
867-68.
115 See infra notes 125-129 and accompanying text, for additional discussion of Holt.
116 Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 423 (2006).
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need for uniform application of a controlled substances tatute."7 The Court rejected
the government's defense because a bare claim for uniformity is not sufficient to meet
the burden of RFRA." Rather, under RFRA the judiciary is charged with striking
"sensible balances" that often lead to religious accommodations and thus
nonuniformity."' RFRA assumes "the feasibility of case-by-case consideration of
religious exemptions ."120 And both RLUIPA in Cutter and RFRA in 0 Centro
avoided transgressing the Establishment Clause by their case-by-case interest
balancing,121 in contrast with the "unyielding" preference struck down in Caldor.122
From Amos, TWA, Larkin, Waz, Cutter, and 0 Centro we have the two
features that set Cador apart. First, unlike the religious exemption from the general
regulatory law in Amos which shielded a religious employer from the labor-law
burdens imposed on others by Title VI, the state in Cddor gave the employee a
sword to force others in the private sector to aid in his religious observance. Second,
the state statute in Cador created an "unyielding" preference for a religious
observance. RFRA and RLUIPA create no such absolute preference. Rather, by their
terms these two statutes codify the familiar interest-balancing calculus of strict
scrutiny.
D. Finding Something, Where There is Little to Nothing
We have seen that when dealing with a true religious exemption there are no
cases adopting a constitutionally based rule of third-party harm that commanded a
majority of the Court.123 The closest thing to it is remote: footnote 25 in a dissenting
117 id
11s Id. at 435-37.
119 Id. at 436.
120 Id. (referencing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721-22 (2005)).
121 Id.
122 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
123 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), involved an unsuccessful claim under the Free Exercise
Clause by an Amish employer to be excused from the payment of social security taxes where the payments
were for himself and the retirement of his employees. Lee did not involve the constitutionality of a
statutory religious exemption or a statutory religious preference, so the case is of no applicability to the
question here. There is dicta in Lee to the effect that an employer waives his religious liberty when he
forms a for-profit business and enters general commerce. Id. at 261. However, that dictum was not
followed by the Court in Hobby Lobby, a case where the RFRA rights of a for-profit corporation
prevailed. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767-75 (2014). Finally, Lee is
sometimes referenced because after the Court's decision came down Congress enacted legislation that
accommodated Amish employers insofar as they were excused from paying the social security taxes of
employees who also were Amish and thus had made alternative arrangements within the sect for
retirement security. See 26 U.S.C. § 3127(a) (2012). That compromise is cited as a proper response to
situations where religious liberty causes harm to third parties. See, e.g., Frank S. Ravitch, Be Carefiul
What You Wish For: WhyHobby Lobby Weakens Religious Freedom, 2016 BYU L. REv. 55, 112-13
(2016). I agree. Congress and state legislatures are the proper venue for the narrowing or denying of
requests for statutory religious exemptions. My point all along is that the question of third-party harm is
for the political branches, not a question to be answered by the judicial branch conjuring a violation of the
Establishment Clause.
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opinion by Justice Ginsburg in Hobby Lobby.24  ust a year later, in Ho, a
unanimous Court upheld an inmate's RLUIPA claim.25 Justice Ginsburg,
subscribing fully to the Court's opinion, stated that she joined the Hokt opinion
because accommodating the inmate's "religious belief ... would not detrimentally
affect" other inmates.126  The Court's opinion makes no mention of the
Establishment Clause. So Justice Ginsburg's words were referring to her
understanding of the operation of the statute, RLUIPA, the only law applied by the
Court in its opinion. She did not say her understanding was attributable to the
Establishment Clause. If her understanding had been derived from the
Establishment Clause, Justice Ginsburg certainly knew how to name the Clause
explicitly having just done so in her Hobby Lobbydissent.
A handful of commentators, eager to find some sign of life in their third-party harm
theory, cite interest-balancing language in HobbyLobbyand Ho l'27 There are postings
in blogs refuting that interpretation,128 because the cited language is in the context of the
compelling-interest test required by RFRA and RLUIPA-not the Establishment
Clause.129 This is so, for there was no defense raised by the federal government in Hobby
Lobby or by the state in Hokt that cost-shifting to third parties was prohibited by the
124 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 n.25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125 Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859 (2015).
126 Id. at 867 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
127 See Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman, & Richard Schragger, When Do Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BALANCE
BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2, 5)
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2812121 [https://perma.cc/J2ME-2Y68] (follow "Open
PDF in Browser" hyperlink) [hereinafter Tebbe, When Accommodations Burden Others] (relying on Hobby
Lobbylanguage); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger, &Nelson Tebbe, Holt v. Hobbs and ThirdParty
Hams, BLOGGER: BALKINIZATION (Jan. 22, 2015, 6:11 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2015/01/holt-v-
hobbs-and-third-party-harms.htrn1 [https://perma.cc/J8A9-JQZN] [hereinafter Schwartzman, Holt v Hobbs]
(relying on HobbyLobbyand Holt); see also Schwartzman, Establshment Clause Part lT supra note 16 (relying
on Cutterlanguage).
121 See Marc DeGirolami, Holt v. Hobbs and the Tird-Party-Ham Establshment Clause heory,
MIRROR OFJUSTICE (Oct. 7, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/10/where-has-the-
establishment-clause-third-party-harm-argument-gone.html [https://perma.cc/65YL-6NKV] (explaining that
the absence of the third-party-harm-Establishment-Clause argument in Holt suggests abandonment of the
theory); Kevin C. Walsh, Did Justice Ginsburg Endorse the Establishment Clause
Third-Party Burdens Argument in Holt v Hobbs?, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Jan. 21, 2015),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/01/did-justice-ginsburg-endorse-the-est'ablishment-
clause-third-party-burdens-argument-in-holt-v-hobbs-.html [https://perma.cc/9W42-GWD9] (arguing that
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in Holtno longer relies on a third-party harm Establishment Clause theory).
129 In Cutter, the Court wrote: "[T]he Act on its face does not founder on shoals the Court's prior
decisions have identified: Properly applying RLUIPA, courts must take adequate account of the burdens
a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries." Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720
(2005) (citing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985)). By the Court's own words, the
quoted language is referencing an application of a statute-not the Establishment Clause. The statute
expressly requires government to apply a compelling-interest test. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (2012). That
passage from Cutter is quoted with approval in HobbyLobby, and presumably for the same application
of the companion act, RFRA, not an application of any requirement found in the Establishment Clause.
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (2014). In Holt, these tireless scholars are unable to find any
language arguably applying their theory, so they content themselves with repeating the above-referenced
quotes from HobbyLobbyand Cutter. See Schwartzman, Holt v. Hobbs, supra note 127.
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Establishment Clause. And it would make no sense for the Court to have raised such a
far-reaching First Amendment theory on its own motion when it was not raised by the
government's lawyers.
The same few academics look to Zubik v. Burwell,'30 conjuring action by the Court
that would keep alight their torch.'3' Once again, however, Zubik, and the cases
consolidated with it, are entirely about how to interpret a statute, RFRA-not about the
Establishment Clause.3 2 And, again, the federal government did not see fit to argue to
the Court that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause due to third-party harm. Nor
is there any indication that the Court raised the theory sua sponte. Finally, all eight
Justices in Zubik were intent on the per curiam disposition not being understood as
deciding any issue on the merits.'33 In sum, downstream ofJustice Ginsburg's footnote
25 in her HobbyLobbydissent, there is no life to be found in the Court's cases of a
third-party harm Establishment Clause theory.
E. OfBaselines and Fundamental Values
The Establishment Clause is not triggered when government does nothing. Only
when government takes an active step to aid or advance religion is the Clause
implicated. As the Supreme Court famously said in Walz "[Flor the men who wrote
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion
connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity."' It is more than just a nice turn of phrase when, as previously
stated, the government does not establish religion by leaving it alone. That the
Establishment Clause requires "sponsorship, financial support, [or] active
involvement" of the state has real consequences and is manifested in the difference
between an exemption and a preference. In the case of a religious exemption, the
government never altered the status quo ante. By way of contrast, in the instance of
a religious preference the government takes steps to affirmatively intervene in a
private dispute and resolve it, namely by promulgating a law favoring religion over
the secular. Accordingly, in the case of a preference any harm is because the
government newly empowered the religious claimant. That empowerment is state
action. With an exemption, the Court does not deny that third parties may have
suffered a harm. Rather, the Court is saying that if there was such incidental harm,
130 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016) (per curiam) (remanding with directions to explore settlement).
There were only eight justices on the Court at the time of this unusual disposition of a case fully briefed
and argued. See Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: A Compromise, with Reallmpact, on Birth Control,
SCOTUSBLOG (May 16, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/opinion-analysis-a-
compromise-with-real-impact-on-birth-control/ [https://perma.cc/34CZ-9BMB].
131 See Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schagger, Symposium: Zubik and the
Demands of Justice, SCOTUSBLOG (May 16, 2016, 9:07 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/05/symposium-zubik-and-the-demands-of-justice/
[https://perma.cc/6YH7-C5FA]; Tebbe, When Accommodations Burden Others, supra note 127, at 5.
132 See Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1559.
133 Id. at 1560; see also id at 1561 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
134 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
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it was not caused by the government. By leaving religion alone, the government never
did "state acts" and there can be no Establishment Clause violation in the absence of
state action.
This view of the Supreme Court marks the line for measuring government
inaction at just prior to the effective date of the general regulatory or tax scheme in
question. In Amos, for example, the Court said: "[W]e find no persuasive evidence
in the record before us that the Church's ability to propagate its religious doctrine
through the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act in 1964."135 Thus, if we must speak of baselines, the Court's baseline
in Amos was just before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act.
Critics ofAmoswould reset the baseline to fit their politics. For example, because
they favor the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") as a matter of social policy, they make
the effective date of this new statutory entitlement the baseline from which to
measure future advancement of religion.'36 If that is the baseline, then when a RFRA
suit later comes along and forces a religious exemption to the ACA mandate of
January 1, 2014,137 it gives the appearance that religion is advanced on the date
RFRA is invoked. That choice of baseline, however, is contrary to what the Court
did in Amos. The ACA counterpart to the Amosbaseline is just prior to the effective
date of the ACA mandate. In accord with the Court's practice in Amos, the ACA
mandate became effective on January 1, 2014, but via RFRA the mandate never
covered religious employers like Hobby Lobby Stores.
The critics' desire to reset the baseline would have major implications. Their
choice favors a much larger role for government in the lives of religious people and
organizations, thereby shrinking that part of civil society for church-state separation
and the desired religious self-governance. Whether such an expansion is good or bad
is not the issue here. Rather, the question is who has the authority to make that
decision and how is it made. The judgment of government expansion by regulations,
taxes, and entitlements is to be made at the discretion of Congress and state
legislative bodies, that is, democratically via these representative political bodies. The
Establishment Clause does not overturn that democratic judgment.
Still other criticism of the Amos and Walzbaseline asserts that the Court's point
of view is without a guiding principle or "value."'38 They point out that the Court's
chosen baseline is likely a field not void of regulation.'39 For example, the
"pre-regulatory" field may be a domain where religion or religious organizations are
already controlled by common law or by existing state legislation.40 In any event, say
the critics, a "pre-regulatory" baseline is not necessarily a wholly unfettered market
135 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 325, 337 (1987).
136 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 371; Tebbe, Establishment Clause Part II, supra
note 16.
13'26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012).
131 See Tebbe, When Accommodations Burden Others, supra note 127, at 7.
139 See id.
140 See Elizabeth Sepper, Religious Exemption, Harm to Others, and the Indeterminacy of a
Common LawBaseline, 106 KY. L.J. 661 (2018).
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of goods and services fixed in time but a domain governed by state law that is itself
evolving. 141
First, note that while these critics attack the principle behind the Supreme
Court's baseline, they do not deny that this is the line laid down by the Court in cases
like Amos and Wz. They thereby tacitly concede that the Court's point of view for
measuring governmental inaction is the one identified here. And, as previously
pointed out, that baseline is binding precedent reaffirmed again and again by the
Court and individual justices.142
Second, the "value" embraced by the Supreme Court is not in the common law
or existing state legislation. The Court is untroubled that its baseline in a given case
might lie within a field already regulated by the common law or existing state
legislation. Rather, the Court's choice of baseline is to embrace the same point of
view as the lawmakers behind the general regulatory or tax scheme in question.143
That point of view is that the lawmakers intend to leave religion undisturbed even as
others similarly situated are being newly regulated or taxed. In that sense, religion
suffers no new disturbance even though it may continue to be subject to the
preexisting common law or state law. This refraining from any new disturbance or
"leaving religion alone" is the thing that is valued.144 That "value," or fundamental
meaning, comes from embracing the original public meaning at the nation's
founding that religious exemptions were not considered an establishment of
religion.145 For the Modern Court to align with this "value," that is, its interpretation
141 See id
142 See authorities collected supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
143 RFRA and RLUIPA operate as religious exemptions writ large. RFRA is, by its terms, effectively
incorporated into every act of Congress that does not expressly reject it. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3 (2012).
The lawmaker's point of view assumes RFRA and RLUIPA operate as if they are part of the regulatory
or tax scheme in question.
144 Academics, displeased with Hobby Lobby, claim that the Court's baseline-setting principle is
laissez-faire capitalism. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
1453, 1471-83 (2015). This represents the technique of taking something you do not like and attempting
to disparage it by association with something widely disliked. But the Court in Hobby Lobby never
identifies anything close to economic libertarianism as its pole star. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2767-68 (2014). Nor did the HobbyLobbydissenters accuse the majority ofbeing driven
by zealous capitalism. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)); id. at 2806 (Breyer and Kagan, JJ.,
dissenting)). What motivated the HobbyLobbymajority and dissenters was plainly stated. At one level,
it was whether to go where the plain text of the statute led, even when it meant providing relief to a closely
held
for-profit corporation. See id. at 2768-75 (majority opinion). And at the policy level, clearly the justices
were struggling between a sincere claim to religious liberty on the one hand, and a desire for widespread
employee access to no-cost contraception, on the other hand. See, e.g., id. at 2785-87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
145 See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understanding ofthe Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1795-98, 1808-30 (2006)
(the understanding of religious exemptions in seventeenth and eighteenth century America was that they
were not regarded as an establishment of religion); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation ofRelgion:
An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 693 (1992) (same); Vincent
Phillip Muioz, Church and State in the Founding-Era State Constitutions, 4 AM. POL. THOUGHT 1,
33 (2015) (same).
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of the Establishment Clause aligns with the meaning of the Establishment Clause
back at the founding, is more than sufficient rationale for its baseline.
II. THE CONCEPT OF "THIRD-PARTY HARM" IS UNDEFINED AND IMPOSSIBLY
EXPANSIVE
Hobby Lobby involved a RFRA challenge to regulations under the Affordable
Care Act that concerned the broad complement of contraceptive drugs and devices
that an employer's health care plan was required to offer employees.'46 Various
corporations, some of which were for-profit but closely held by families with pro-life
scruples, had religious objections to the contraceptive mandate.'47 The two closely
held corporations that were represented in the consolidated appeals in Hobby Lobby
objected to four drugs and devices that sometimes acted as abortifacients.'48 If the
corporations prevailed on their RFRA claims, which eventually they did, then
employees who wanted health care coverage for these abortifacients would not
receive the four drugs and devices.'49 This reduction in the employees' health care
benefits was mischaracterized by progressive scholars as harmful cost-shifting caused
by RFRA.'5s The Court did not deny that there was a loss of benefits among
employees, just that the cause of the loss was not the government."' Because RFRA
is an exemption rather than a preference, the real cause of the third-party loss of
benefits was the private acts of Hobby Lobby Stores.15 2 The scholars go on to argue
that the reduced insurance coverage, said to be brought about by RFRA, was a
violation of the Establishment Clause.'53 But Hobby Lobby Stores, not RFRA, was
the cause of the third-party loss. The Establishment Clause checks "state action,"
not the private acts of Hobby Lobby Stores.
As previously noted, progressives argue that, in setting the baseline for purposes
of the Establishment Clause, the courts should assume that healthcare is universally
available.'54 Universal coverage, of course, is not the actual state of affairs under the
ACA. However, if we are to assume a world where the default position is
comprehensive healthcare coverage for all workers, then it is a mere tautology that
departure from such a baseline because of a RFRA accommodation for Hobby Lobby
Stores is a loss or "burden" for the store's employees and a windfall or "benefit" for
146 HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762-63.
147 M at 2764-66.
14Id. at 2762-64.
149 See id.
15o See, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 372-80; Tebbe, Establishment Clause Partdj
supra note 16.
"' See HobbyLobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784-85.
152 This is also what happened in Amos, where the cause of the harm was the Mormon Church and
not the civil rights exemption. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). And, of course, the Establishment Clause no more runs against
Hobby Lobby Stores than it does against a church.
153 See Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 13, at 55-56; Gedicks & Van Terrell, supra note 13, at
348; Schwartzman, Establishment Clause Part II, supra note 16.
154 SeeTebbe, Establishment Clause Part supra note 16.
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the employer's religion. But that is a political assumption, not constitutional law.
Why not assume a world where RFRA accommodations are universal? Then it is a
mere tautology that there is no "burden" on store employees because the status quo
ante would be no healthcare benefits. Indeed, one can make all sorts of fantasy
assumptions and draw the resulting baseline accordingly. What these commentators
have forgotten is that the baseline is fixed to serve the principles of the Establishment
Clause.' That is what guided the Court in Walz and Amos and it is what must
guide us here.
Despite the prodding of these scholars,'6 the Solicitor General of the United
States did not argue that RFRA violated the Establishment Clause. However, he did
make a parallel argument, to wit: the loss of contraceptive benefits categorically
tipped RFRA's prescribed compelling-interest test against the employers.1s7 The
Court rejected that argument with these words:
[I]t could not reasonably be maintained that any burden on religious
exercise [incurred by the closely held corporations], no matter how
onerous and no matter how readily the government interest could be
achieved through alternative means, is permissible under RFRA so long
as the relevant legal obligation requires the religious [closely held
corporations] to confer a benefit on third parties.
Thus, while RFRA requires consideration of any harm to third parties whatever the
source, it does so by the balancing test prescribed by the act, not a categorical rule.
The Court went on to point out how easily a third-party benefit as a result of an
entitlement program can be characterized, when withheld, as a "harm" and
thus-under the Solicitor General's theory-overthrow RFRA: "By framing any
Government regulation as benefitting a third party, the Government could turn all
regulations into [third-party] entitlements to which nobody could object on religious
grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless."'
If allowed, the Solicitor General's clever framing of third-party entitlements
would render not only RFRA, but all religious exemptions a nullity. With such an
unbounded theory, "the Government could turn all regulations into [third-party]
entitlements to which nobody could object on religious grounds."'60 The Court's
logic applies beyond government benefit programs. For example, the legislation that
is subjected to a RFRA challenge could be entirely regulatory, such as a labor law,
and the third parties that progressives characterize as harmed by loss of the regulatory
"benefit" could be the employer's entire workforce. Because there is no stopping point
to this clever framing of the loss of regulatory protection as "third-party harm," the
155 For the view that, at the nation's founding, statutory exemptions were not an establishment of
religion, see supra note 145 and infra notes 187, 190 and accompanying text.
156 See discussion and sources cited supra note 16.
157 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014).
15S Id.
159 d
160 C4
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Solicitor General's logic would not just overthrow RFRA but would upend all
religious exemptions. Fortunately, the Hobby Lobby Court repudiated this
transformation of "lost entitlements" into third-party "harms" that defeat RFRA.161
Scholars propounding the third-party harm theory could see that the extended
logic of their theory would wipe out all religious exemptions.16 2 After all, the
extension of exemptions to some is a loss to all others differently situated, however
attenuated the "damage" done by such differential treatment. In an attempt to
generate a limiting principle and save their theory, progressives suggest that the
"harm" should count only if the third parties are individually identifiable.'63 Harms
suffered more generally, indeed by large parts of the general public, would not by
their theory qualify for Establishment Clause treatment.'64 Accordingly, in the
military draft exemption cases it is conceded that there is no disqualifying harm to
third parties because xtending an exemption to a few young men does not produce
specific, identifiable victims who are drafted in their stead.65 In the instance of
property tax exemptions for religious organizations as in Walz, it is conceded that
there is no unconstitutional harm to third parties because the other taxpayers that
must make up the shortfall in the municipal budget (or those who must do without
because of revenue shortfalls) are not individually identifiable.'66 Amos, of course,
goes against this attempt to cap or limit what counts as a third-party harm, for in
Amos the putative "victim" of the Title VII religious exemption was easily
identifiable, namely, the building janitor who lost his job.' 7
161 Id
162 The following discretionary religious exemptions in federal legislation are illustrative. Under the
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), certain members of religious groups can avoid paying Social
Security and Medicare taxes if they have taken a vow of poverty as a member of a religious order and they
perform tasks usually required of an active member of such order. See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(r) (2012). Under
the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA), members of certain religious groups, including the
Amish and Mennonites, are exempt from Social Security taxes if they are a member of a recognized
religion and hold conscientious objections to accepting benefits of retirement insurance. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 1 4 0 2(g)(1) (2012). Under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA), some religious employers that
perform certain services (such as services for a church or church-sponsored school) do not have to pay
unemployment axes. See 26 U.S.C. § 3309(b) (2012). Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA), pension plans maintained by some religious organization-called "church plans"-are
exempt from regulation. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (2008). Under the National Labor Relations Act,
workers who have religious beliefs that object to joining a union are not required to pay union dues, but
they may have to pay an equal amount to a non-religious, non-labor charitable organization. See29 U.S.C.
§ 169 (2012).
163 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 363-71 (making ad hoc determinations between
"material" burdens and those the authors deem constitutionally acceptable). Hence, in the case of the
ACA mandate, Gedicks & Van Tassell would allow religious exemptions for employees of churches, but
not Hobby Lobby. Id. at 380-83. Yet, the women working for a church are just as harmed by loss of their
health benefits as are women working for a retail store. This is personal-preference lawmaking, not
constitutional law.
164 See id at 364.
165 Id
167 Id. at 368; see also supra notes 2-7, 25-29, 74-82 and accompanying text (discussing Amos).
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Amos aside, it is true that with some religious exemption cases there is no
measureable harm incurred by identifiable third parties, whereas in other exemption
cases there is measureable incidental harm to identifiable third parties.'6 ' However,
this is a distinction not found anywhere in Supreme Court cases decided under the
Establishment Clause, and that is to be expected. Given the historic purposes of the
Establishment Clause-restraining government in its involvement with and
authority in religious matters-it makes no difference whether the individuals
harmed by a church-state breach are specifically identifiable or not. While perhaps
relevant to an issue like standing, that the harm is either concrete or diffused does
not change the work of the Establishment Clause. Rather, progressives are making
this distinction not because it is one required by the Establishment Clause, but
because it is necessary to salvage their theory of third-party harm, a theory sweeping
so broadly as to do away with all religious exemptions.
This attempt to save the third-party harm theory by requiring an identifiable
victim misconceives the basic nature of the Establishment Clause. The third-party
harm thesis is that at some point the cost shifting becomes so great that the "scales
tip" against a religious exemption's validity under the Establishment Clause.'6 ' But
that is at odds with the operation of the Establishment Clause, which progressive
scholars correctly admit is structural in nature. 17 Unlike a rights-based clause (like
free speech or free exercise) where the focus is on the rights holder, and his or her
injury, the no-establishment restraint is about policing the boundary between two
centers of authority, church and state, much like a separation of powers doctrine.'7 '
16s With respect to some of the Supreme Court's religious exemption cases there is no measurable
harm incurred by identifiable third parties. In addition to Walz, see, for example, Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306 (1952) (releasing some students to attend off-campus classes in religion causes no measurable
harm to other identifiable students); Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (exempting some from
military draft causes no measurable harm to other draft-age men).With respect to other religious
exemption cases there is measurable incidental harm to identifiable third parties. In addition to Amos,
see, for example, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (religious school's lay teachers
could not form a union); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S 40 (1980) (in civil litigation between two
private-sector parties, recognition of clergy testimonial privilege will harm the party seeking the
testimony).
169 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 375-82 (discussing interest-balancing that would
permit cost-shifting by churches and religious nonprofits but not religious for-profits); Schwartzman,
Establishment Clause Part I, supra note 16 (same).
170 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 347. However, with a structural Establishment
Clause this sort of balancing is never done. Further, as if the case law under the clause is not complex
enough, these commentators would turn the Establishment Clause into an occasion for Lochner-era
balancing of competing economic interests. Sec id. at 375-79 (implying that a little economic cost-shifting
is said to be constitutionally valid, but at some juncture a federal judge is to just know when too many
dollars tote up to the tipping point against RFRA). Such a rule is dangerous for all sorts of reasons, such
as lack of uniformity in application of constitutional line-drawing, as well as putting unguided discretion
in the hands of the judiciary.
171 See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a StructuralRestraint on GovernmentalPower,
84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998). Progressives concede that the Establishment Clause is structural, see Gedicks
&Van Tassell, supra note 13, at 347, but seem not to realize that their concession is fatal to their theory.
Structural limits are categorical and cannot be waived, such as the limitations on a federal court's subject
matter jurisdiction. A federal court either has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not; there is no
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A structural analysis asks about the outer boundary of the government's power; when
that power is exceeded, the constitution is violated without regard to who is injured
or the degree of the injury. 7 2 Thus in a separation of powers analysis, there is no
case-by-case interest balancing.'73 Rather, either the Establishment Clause is
violated or it is not, the boundary between church and state needing to be fixed no
matter who the claimant is.
III. PLAIN LANGUAGE, COMMON SENSE, AND ORIGINAL MEANING
The Establishment Clause reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."'74 The plain text does not deny Congress the power to
"make ... law" about religion. 75 Rather, it more narrowly denies Congress the power
to "make ... law" about "an establishment" of religion.' 6 Assume, for example, that
soon after 1791 Congress enacted a comprehensive law regulating conscription into
the Army and Navy. In exercising its constitutional power to oversee the armed
forces,"' Congress also provided an exemption from the military draft for religious
pacifists. Nothing in the Establishment Clause prohibits such an exemption."' The
adoption of a draft exemption for religious pacifists is certainly to "make [a] law"
balancing between competing interests. In like manner, the Establishment Clause is regarded by the
federal judiciary as categorical in its operation, separating church and government. In a given case, either
the church-state boundary is violated or it is not. There is no balancing test with the Establishment
Clause. Yet a rule based on third-party harms necessitates such talk of balancing by its scholarly
proponents. In their theory, harms might be a little incurred or greatly incurred, small injuries or big
injuries, substantial or trivial in the burden to be borne. Injuries of this sort are in the nature of those
protected by a constitutional rights clause, not injuries safeguarded by a power-limiting restraint such as
the Establishment Clause.
172 Proponents of the third-party harm theory attempt to answer a question that is not asked by the
Establishment Clause, to wit: who is individually harmed enough that the boundary between church and
state is breached? See Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, How Much May
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAw, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED
STATEs 215 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017) (suggesting a test that differentiates between small
and large harms incurred by third parties). The Establishment Clause, however, is not about personal
rights. Church-state relations are about hard lines that restrain the institutions of government from
exceeding their power when it comes to religion. If that line is crossed and thus legitimate power abused,
it is a constitutional violation whether or not identifiable individuals suffer harm. By asking the wrong
question these scholars embark on a fool's errand.
173 That is why the Court has been less stringent when it comes to the "injury in fact" requirement
for standing to raise an Establishment Clause claim. Esbeck, supra note 171, at 34-42. Hence, even
taxpayer standing is permitted in claims under the Establishment Clause. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968). By definition there is no individualized injury in a taxpayer claim; nonetheless, standing is
allowed because without such allowances many clear-cut church-state violations could not be addressed
by the judiciary.
174 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
175 id
1761d.
177 The Constitution grants to Congress the authority "[t]o make Rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
171 See Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) (holding that clergy, theology students,
and religious pacifists could be exempt from the military draft consistent with the Establishment Clause).
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about religion, but it is not more narrowly to "make [a] law" about "an establishment"
of religion. Stated differently, the Establishment Clause does not require
religion-blind government or formal neutrality.'79 The draft exemption is designed
to merely allow pacifists and clergy to follow religious precepts to which they are
already so inclined, not to permit the government to affirmatively advance pacifistic
religions. In short, the object of the exemption is not to advance religion but for the
government to stay out of the way and thereby let those subscribing to religious
beliefs to continue (or not) to act on them.
As a second example, it is fully consistent with the scope of the
Establishment Clause for Congress to enact comprehensive legislation under the
Interstate Commerce and Taxing Clauses,' requiring large employers to
provide unemployment compensation to their employees, but also to exempt
religious organizations from the regulation and accompanying tax. To enact such a
religion-specific exemption is certainly to "make [a] law" about religion. But the
exemption is not more narrowly a law about "an establishment" of religion.'"' Once
again, religion-blind government is not constitutionally required. And, once again,
the statutory exemption is designed to merely allow religious employers to privately
follow (or not) certain religious beliefs and practices when they are already motivated
to do so.
With respect to the constitutional text, it is a categorical mistake to presume that
a statutory religious exemption is a form of religious favoritism or preference.
Although the government cannot "make [a] law" in support of "an establishment" of
religion, it may "make [a] law" in support of "the free exercise" of religion. Indeed,
this would have to be so because the Free Exercise Clause is itself a law in support of
religious freedom. Moreover, there are two types of provisions in the 1787 U.S.
Constitution that expressly safeguard independent acts of religious exercise: the
provisions permitting an affirmation in lieu of an oath to accommodate Quakers and
other minority sects,182 and not counting Sunday against the ten-day time limit for a
President to sign or veto a bill before it becomes law by its own force.'83 The First
Amendment would not make any sense if the Establishment Clause contradicted the
179 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing formal neutrality or religion-blind
government).
13o The Interstate Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce ...
among the several States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Taxing Clause reads, "The Congress shall
have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ... but all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
's' See Rojas v. Fitch, 127 F.3d 184, 187-89 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that a statutory exemption for
faith-based organizations from an unemployment compensation tax did not violate the Establishment
Clause).
132 There are three such accommodations: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
8; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
113 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 ("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days
(Sunday excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if
he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not
be a law.").
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Free Exercise Clause, or if the Establishment Clause overrode or nullified these two
accommodations of religious exercise in the Constitution.
In a similar vein, the plain language of the Free Exercise Clause does not allow
for a law "prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."18 4 However, it is a one-way
clause. It prohibits the government from restraining free exercise, but it does not
prohibit Congress from being helpful to religion. On the "being-helpful" side, rather,
the only restriction is not to go so far as to "make [a] law" about "an establishment."
Therefore, Congress retains discretion to enact a law allowing those wishing to
privately pursue their religious interests to do so without government interference.
For example, a public school district may have a policy allowing a teacher to observe
a religious holy day as a paid "personal day."' Not only is such a policy not
"prohibiting" free exercise, but it falls well short of "mak[ing a] law" about "an
establishment." The plain text clearly demonstrates that there is considerable room
between the two Religion Clauses for discretionary religious exemptions, what the
Court has called the "play in the joints" between the Religion Clauses.'6
The common sense of this plain-language reading is also readily evident. All
agree that the First Amendment is pro-freedom of speech and pro-freedom of the
press. By the same token, the First Amendment is pro-religious freedom. This is as
true of the Establishment Clause as it is true of the Free Exercise Clause.
Government supporting religion, on the one hand, and government supporting acts
of religious freedom, on the other hand, are two very different things. The former is
deemed harmful to liberty and thus prohibited; the latter is good for liberty and so
allowed. One long-standing application of this allowable "good" is the discretionary
enactment of religious exemptions.
Research has shown that at the time of the nation's founding Americans did not
regard statutory religious exemptions as "an establishment.""' Thus, the original
public meaning of the Establishment Clause is that it allows religious exemptions at
the discretion of the legislature. Even for the non-originalist, this history is not easily
ignored. As the Supreme Court recently said, "the Establishment Clause must be
interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.""' Moreover,
looking at the question from the other end of history, a survey done just twenty-five
years ago showed that there were approximately 2,000 statutory religious exemptions
in federal and state codes.'"' Hundreds more such exemptions have been added since
114 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
.s. See, e.g., OP 201: Application for Excuse ofAbsence Without Pay and/or as Non-Attendance,
N.Y.C. DEP'T OF EDUC., http://www.uft.org/files/attachments/op201_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLY6-
X2LQ] (New York City Department of Education form showing teacher absence may be excused for
"Religious Observance").
16 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
137 See authorities collected supra note 15.
133 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1819 (2014) (internal quotation omitted).
19 James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment,
78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445-50 (1992). The survey did not try to count exemptions appearing in
regulations and those existing by longstanding official practice, thus the actual number of exemptions is
even greater.
Vol. Io6632
2017--2018 Do Discretionary Religious Exemptions 63
Violate the Establishment Clause?
the survey because of the explosive growth in regulatory government and increased
religious pluralism. Historically, religious exemptions were nacted as a safeguard to
protect religious minorities against an oppressive established church: "The
established church had no need for exemptions, because its teachings were in accord
with government policy. Exemptions protect minority religions, and they emerged
only in the wake of toleration of dissenting worship."' If all or most religious
exemptions were to fall today because of some ersatz no-establishment theory,
religious minorities will suffer the most.
Finally, recent social science surveys show that religious claims brought before
the courts to secure exemptions from generally applicable laws are few, and even
fewer are successful."' This data refutes the alarmist cries that religionists want to
treat with impunity laws that are binding on everyone else. There is some value to
the argument that reproductive rights and anti-discrimination laws should be
followed by all, no exceptions. But that is an argument to be directed to the political
branch that makes the law, Congress and state legislatures. Once that branch has
heard these arguments and struck the balance between competing interests, it is
wrong for progressive scholars, who did not get their way in the political arena, to
distort the Establishment Clause so that they can make another run at achieving
their policy preferences.
CONCLUSION
In weighing the merits of statutory religious exemptions, it is entirely proper for
Congress or a state legislature to consider any incidental effects detrimental to third
parties. In some instances, no doubt, elected lawmakers should exercise their
discretion and narrow or deny a sought-after exemption for a religious practice or
observance. What is not the law, however, is that the presence of such incidental
effects on those who do not benefit from a religious exemption causes an otherwise
lawful exemption to violate the Establishment Clause.
Progressives have little to align against the formidable array of century-old
precedents, especially such venerable cases as Amos, Wz, and 0 Centro. Of the
other cases in which the Supreme Court has formed a majority opinion, like Caldor,
TWA, and Larkin, all involve a religious preference rather than a religious
exemption. The logic of a religious exemption as a way of leaving religion alone or
not regulating religious observance, as distinguished from active intervention by
government, is straightforward and compelling. Further, both the plain language of
the text of the Religion Clauses, which does not require formal neutrality, as well as
the original understanding of "an establishment of religion" at the founding, point
to one conclusion: discretionary religious exemptions do not violate the
190 Laycock, supra note 145, at 1796.
191 See Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, Constitutional Anomalies or As-Applied
ChallengesA Defense ofRehgious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. Rev. 1595, 1596 (2018); Luke W. Goodrich
& Rachel N. Busick, Sex, Drugs, and Eagle Feathers:An Empirical Study ofFederal Religious Freedom
Cases, 48 SETON HALL L. REv. 353 (2018).
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Establishment Clause. The presence of incidental harm to others does not change
that outcome. This is because the causal agent behind any such third-party harm is
not the government, but an individual privately following the dictates of his or her
faith. The Establishment Clause, of course, requires "state action" and so does not
run against these private actors.
